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Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today

I would like to start by explaining how I came to modify the agreed theme and, to some extent, focus of this contribution.* There were some general reasons for doing so, which occurred to me as I was reading the Congress programme, but recent political events provided a still more decisive impetus. The general title of our Congress—'Migration and Racism'— corresponds to a long-standing project that was conceived in a different conjuncture. It would seem to imply two ideas which, though being far from defunct, now need to be contextualized, or placed in a broader and more complex whole. It is clearer than ever that the problem we are discussing is crucial to a genuine human-rights policy in the years ahead of us. However, 'Migration and Racism' suggests that there is a particular correlation between two apparently well-defined phenomena, the one seeming to belong to the realm of economic and demographic facts, the other to the field of social behaviour and ideologies. This means that while the present pattern of migrations does not inevitably 'produce' racism—as a certain conservative discourse

frequently maintains—it does give *contemporary racism* a focus, such that in our countries it is above all an anti-immigrant racism directed against the *Gastarbeiter*, their families and their descendants. This is apparently what makes it distinctive in relation to other historical situations. There can be no doubt that French writers have been quite inclined to see things in this way, and our German friends have spontaneously done the same. This is the first idea that has to be examined.

This leads directly to the second idea. Is it certain that, in *every* European country, things can automatically be posed in such a way? Current terminologies would suggest that this is not at all the case. In Britain people speak of 'race relations', and the populations who are victims of racism are called 'Blacks' rather than 'migrants'—which evokes a much more directly post-colonial situation and imagery. In fact there is no real uniformity from one country to another, only a diversity of 'national' situations in which the link between migration and racism is unevenly imposed. The source and handling of immigration, the nature of racial discrimination, the level of social tensions, the scale of political repercussions, and particularly of organized racist and anti-racist movements—none of these is by any means the same in each country.

A New European Racism

Nevertheless, we have had and still have reasons to suppose that these different configurations influence one another, and that in the last few years they have finally been converging to produce a formidable new phenomenon which we might call *European racism*. It is a question not just of analogies but of *institutional* phenomena that are given added momentum by the 'construction of Europe' and sustained by an ideal image of Europe itself. In fact discrimination is written into the very nature of the European Community, which in each country directly leads to the definition of two categories of foreigners with unequal rights. The developing EC structures—particularly if they give rise to thorny issues of individual movement, frontier controls, social rights, and so on—can only sharpen this trend and make the 'difference' between Community 'insiders' and 'outsiders' as such a locus of overt or latent conflict. The fact that, in Europe as a whole, a large proportion of 'Blacks' or 'immigrants' are not foreigners in the eyes of the law merely intensifies the contradictions, and intersects with the ever more pressing question of European identity. On the one hand, then, the emergence of a European racism, or model of racism, raises the issue of Europe's place in a world system, with its economic inequalities and population flows. On the other hand, it appears to be inextricably bound up with questions relating to collective rights, citizenship, nationality and the treatment of minorities, where the real political framework is not each particular country but Europe as such.

Here things become much more complicated, but recent events serve to clarify matters and to challenge at least some of our presuppositions.

In fact, what is the Europe we are speaking of? We cannot do without this reference, and yet we are quite incapable of fixing its meaning in any univocal manner. We cannot define 'Europe' today by reference either to a political entity, to a historical-cultural entity, or to an 'ethnic' entity. Perhaps the most obscure question of all is whether a 'definition of Europe' entails the possibility of 'defining Europeans', as members of a certain community, as holders of certain rights, and as representatives of a certain culture. It is a question fraught with the greatest significance for analysis of the institutional and ideological aspects of racism.[1]

The official image—I am now tempted to say the official myth—on which we ourselves lived for many years was that such definitions of Europe and Europeanness were possible in principle. It was sometimes asked whether, or to what degree, the 'construction of Europe' would eventually be carried through at the expense of national specificities, but no one really hesitated about the reference of the word 'Europe'. In our working project this reference simply went without saying: the real problem concerned 'migrations' and 'racism'. Now everything has changed and the opposite is the case. Before there can be any serious analysis of racism and its relationship to migrations, we have to ask ourselves what this word 'Europe' means and what it will signify tomorrow.

In reality, however, we are here discovering the *truth* of the earlier situation, which explodes the representation that we used to have of it. Europe is not something that is 'constructed', at a slower or faster pace, with greater or lesser ease; it is a historical problem without any pre-established solution. 'Migrations' and 'racism' form part of the elements of this problem.

Why has the situation been reversed? We all know the answer. It is because of the possible effects of three historic events succeeding one another within the space of a year: the collapse of the system of socialist states; the unification of Germany; and the outbreak of a major crisis in the Middle East likely at any moment to turn into a war which, though perhaps not a 'world war', would evidently not be 'local' and would require a new category. None of the three events has yet produced all its effects, and this is what makes the task of analysis both indispensable and exceptionally risky for us. There can be no doubt—particularly if one looks back to the causes—that they are closely interconnected. The nature of this link, which is not simply one of temporal succession, is not at all clear. But it is anyway certain that none of these events can now develop its effects independently of the other two, and that, *according to how these effects develop, the existence and nature of a 'European' entity will present itself in utterly different ways.*

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[1] We should note in passing that the question of giving an *endogenous*, self-referring definition of 'Europeans' has only come up very recently. Until the middle of the twentieth century, the principal meaning of this name referred to groups of colonizers in each of the colonized regions elsewhere in the world.

Let us here just outline some of the questions posed. The collapse of 'actually existing socialism' is definitive: the political crisis and the economic crisis have in the end joined together. In a way this is the execution of the testament of 1968. But the collapse is issuing neither in a renewal of socialism or a 'third way' (as GDR intellectuals voicing the critique of the Honecker regime still thought a year ago), nor in the political liberalism dreamt of by new technocratic 'elites'. Its first results are administrative disintegration, a worsening of economic hardship, and an outburst of nationalism at every level. The ending of the political division of Europe is a *progressive* development of immense historical significance. It is understandably accompanied by a certain enthusiasm among intellectuals for the idea of 'European culture', and one can share this enthusiasm which is productive of new ideas and projects. But the mass ideological reality corresponding to this culture is *at first* one of exacerbated nationalisms or, to be more precise, an unstable equilibrium between the exacerbation of national paricularisms and the advance of the 'American' model of consumption and social communication.

In its fall, 'actually existing socialism' carries away both the bureaucratic state and single-party apparatus and the egalitarian utopia of the nineteenth-century workers' movement. But the outcome is not at all the 'end of history', the triumph of a 'liberal' system of regulating social conflicts. On the contrary, once the great simplifying opposition between 'ideologies' and 'camps' has been annulled, we can expect a rapid differentiation of 'liberalism' itself—in particular, a re-emergence of the problem of *democracy in capitalism*, since the identity of the two terms is no longer 'guaranteed' by the presence in the East of a system at once anti-capitalist and anti-democratic.

The greatest and most acute uncertainty at the present moment concerns the effects of the Middle East crisis. Of course, these will depend completely on whether or not we slide into war, and on the length and destructiveness of any such conflict. But they will inescapably bring about a reshaping of the 'camps' as they are now drawn. We can at least make three observations which will remain valid in any hypothesis.

First, the end of the Cold War is establishing the United States as the only superpower. But in the present situation, instead of bringing an attenuation of conflicts, this means the impossibility of a stable world order, the necessity of actual resort to force, and probably the formation of several 'regional' imperialisms.[2]

Second, we are now coming out of a phase in which the countries of the North successfully, and with no regard for the consequences, 'exported' the crisis to the Third World, so that their own economic

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[2] Naturally, one key element in the 'linkage' between new sub-imperialisms in the South and the crisis of imperialisms in the North is the weight of arms production and exports in the latter's economy and politics.

stabilization was paid for through the absolute pauperization of the other, 'third' countries. The phase we are entering will be one in which conflicts over the control of oil and other raw materials will endanger social and economic equilibrium in the 'developed' countries themselves.

Third, we can see a tightening 'linkage' of political and social development in the Middle East and the European countries—or in other words, the effective constitution (or reconstitution) of a 'Mediterranean' ensemble that is highly conflictual in the dimensions of religion, culture, economics and politics. The two complexes making up the 'Arab nation' and the 'European nation'—neither of them securely fixed, for different historical reasons—are closely bound up with each other and cannot evolve independently.[3] But the future 'iron curtain' and the future 'wall' threaten to pass somewhere in the Mediterranean, or somewhere to the south-east of the Mediterranean, and they will not be easier to bring down than their predecessors.

At this point we must try to give some thought to the likely effects of current events upon the 'construction of Europe'. I feel quite incapable of making any prophecies, but it is necessary to put forward some working hypotheses for discussion. The first of these is of a negative character: namely, that in spite of the moves towards transnationalization of European societies, which cannot be rolled back, and in spite of the probably irreversible changes at the level of institutions, *the political-economic 'little Europe' will not come about as expected*.

This narrow European Union, part supranational and part confederal, developed as a rival to American power, though associated with it in the framework of political-military confrontation between East and West. The political victory of the United States over the Soviet Union —whose continued existence as such is itself now in question—has gone together with a relative weakening of US economic supremacy in the world. Eastern Europe is being opened up as a priority field for expansion of the capitalist market, and this too is likely to sharpen competition between Europe and the United States. But in this competition not all European countries, even in the West, have the same interests and the same possibilities. Chauvinist, anti-German discourse, audible in France and elsewhere in Europe since the reunification of the two Germanies became a foregone conclusion, rests upon analogies and an imagery of national conflict in Europe that probably belong to a past age. Nevertheless, whereas the construction of Europe was based on a relative equilibrium between several countries, it is now facing a huge internal *imbalance* of power and a patently uneven capacity for economic and political exploitation of the 'new frontier' in the East. The Gulf crisis also shows very clearly that the various EC countries do not have the same interests, or do not assess

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[3] Important in this respect are not only the 'Muslim' populations in Europe but also the European or Europeanized enclaves in the 'Arab' world (Israel, the various multilingual and multicultural societies stemming from French colonization, and so forth). There is also an interlocking of interests, symbolized by the organically coupled financial strengths of Kuwait and the City of London.

their interests in the same way, in the confrontation between American imperialism and the 'sub-imperialisms' of the Middle East. These are all lasting factors of dissension, even if their political effect cannot be immediately foreseen.

It is therefore worth dwelling for a moment on the following two interpretative schemas. First, Europe will more and more be not a closed entity like a federal state or a multinational empire, but rather an *open* aggregation with several concentric circles of supranational institutions in unstable equilibrium. It will form an area where different economic-cultural aggregates—whose historic specificity, in each case, is at least as strong as that of 'European unity' itself—meet, and if necessary clash, with one another. These will be: a *Euro–American* aggregate, a *Euro–Mediterranean* (mainly Euro–Arab or Euro–Muslim) aggregate, and a *Euro–ex-Soviet* or *Euro–Eastern* aggregate comprising all or some of the countries which, having been stamped by the socialist regime, face the task of 'liquidating' it. These aggregates, of course, are not juxtaposed to one another but largely superimposed. *There are not one but several 'common homes' in Europe.*

Second, this externally open aggregation, by virtue of being an area of intersection between several world spaces rather than a truly autonomous unit, is not and will not be any less *partitioned* by a number of ineliminable 'frontiers'. These are not just political state frontiers but, above all, moving social frontiers, 'invisible' on the maps but materialized in administrative regulations and social practices; 'inner frontiers' between populations who differ in origin and in their location within the division of labour. In fact this 'Europe' is already and will be more and more the meeting point between several types of political-economic migration, particularly from 'the South' and from 'the East'. For both ideological and economic reasons, an attempt will be made to give them different statuses, by facing up to acquired obstacles (especially the post-colonial situations) and embarrassing promises such as those made at Helsinki.

What is thus taking shape is a 'melting pot', or an unstable hierarchical complex of ethnic-social groups. But unlike the American experience, which it might otherwise call to mind, it presupposes not the erasing of original nationalities but their perpetuation in a different gear.

A Historic Reversal

If these very general prospects are accurate, they imply a kind of reversal of the secular course of history, some further aspects of which we shall look at in a moment. Whereas Europe, for three centuries, exported to the whole world its political models and the consequences of its conflicts between nations and 'blocs', an opposite process is now coming into view. 'The world strikes back': Europe is the prime site where the political problems of the whole world are crystallizing—if not the weak link, then at least the sensitive point of their contradictions.

This situation takes on its full meaning in an examination of the

'German question'. Recent events have led most commentators to conclude that the German national (and nationalist) tradition, which people had forgotten or pretended to forget, is resurging before our eyes as a determining factor in European history. In short, it would seem that there will be either a 'German Europe' or a Germany without Europe. Without denying the element of truth in this observation, we might set it against the dialectically opposite idea that Germany, of all European countries, will face the crisis of the 'nation' form at its most acute. One reason for this is that there is nothing self-evident in the reproduction of a single 'German people' out of the populations of the ex-GDR and the ex-FRG. Most important, however, if we assume that it is impossible to block freedom of movement—the very freedom in whose name the countries of Eastern Europe rebelled—then *Germany will be the potential concentrate of all the 'differences' and all the ethnic and social tensions of which we have been speaking*. Berlin, as the political-geographic centre of a historical area encompassing London, Stockholm, Warsaw, Moscow, Budapest, Istanbul, Baghdad, Cairo, Rome, Algiers, Madrid and Paris, cannot become the capital of the new Germany without also being the 'centre' of political tensions emanating from the various regions in this space.

We can now return to the question, or rather questions, of racism as it shows itself and develops within this framework. I am increasingly of the view that what we have to analyse—and what the term 'neoracism' only imperfectly expresses—is not just a variant of the earlier racisms from which our 'definitions' and schemas derive. Rather, we are dealing with a *new* configuration, one that will be more and more so as it 'reflects' the originality of the social structure and the relationships of force that are being constituted in Europe at the end of the twentieth century. This is why the very word 'race', and such complements or substitutes as colour, ethnicity, outsideness, immigration or even religion, is today changing its meaning, as it has already done two or three times as a function of the great 'revolutions' of modern history. But for such a configuration actually to crystallize from one end of society to the other, sinking into everyday perceptions of the 'differences' or 'otherness' of human groups and into the technical language of administration, communication and social science, three quite different types of factor probably have to be superimposed on one another. First, there has to be a tradition or schema of *collective memory*, part conscious, part unconscious, which is marked by 'traumatic' events, blended into the actual history of institutions and culture, and periodically reactivated by historical events that indicate its persistence. Second, a *social structure of discrimination* has to exist in actual life; one which, if not stable, serves the necessary functions in economic and class relations and is at least partially inscribed within the organization of the state. Third, there has to be a *conjuncture* of institutional crisis, in which the relationship of institutions (above all the state) to their own ideological foundations, and the 'identity-constituting' relationship of individuals to those institutions, are violently shaken in such a way as to produce a mass phenomenon of intellectual and moral insecurity.

These elements can be detected in the present situation almost

everywhere in Europe. They help to explain, in particular, how a sub-terranean link is established between the evolution of 'public opinion' and of openly racist political movements—movements which, though small-scale except in France, are capable of imposing on the whole society at least part of their 'problematic'. As we go through the list of them, we begin to understand both that racism in Europe has very deep, *permanent* roots and foundations, *and* that a quite special con-juncture is required for it to become a *political* phenomenon capable of hegemonizing, if not organizing, masses of people in several nations and social layers.

Ideological Schemas of Racism

In fact European culture, and so the very idea or myth of Europe, intrinsically contains, though is not identical with, two specifically racist *ideological schemas* which are likely to continue producing memory and collective-perception effects: the colonial schema, and the schema of anti-Semitism. This is quite familiar ground, but a number of observations would be in order here.

First, 'decolonization' was never completed, particularly in countries like France, nor did it go together with a new collective awareness of what had been involved in the 'division of the world' among so-called 'civilized' nations, which in reality had been the bearers of barbarism. Second, while colonization was a European enterprise, for which the Berlin Conference of 1885 might serve as the symbol, anti-Semitism too was a European phenomenon. Without in any way softening the condemnation of Nazism, it is time to put paid to the myth of abso-lute German peculiarity in this respect. The evidence is today unfor-tunately all too striking when, at the two ends of Europe, in France and the ex-socialist countries, the intensification of nationalism is accompanied by the reconstitution of overt anti-Semitism. There are also, to be sure, other forms of xenophobia. But there is no doubt in my mind that if the sharpest edge of racist discourse and mentalities tends to press on the populations of 'Arab-Islamic' origin who have permanently settled in Europe, this is because a *condensation* or super-imposition of the colonial and anti-Semitic schemas has occurred in this case, so that imagery of racial superiority and imagery of cultural and religious rivalry reinforce each other.

It is essential to refocus on the traditional schemas of European racism if we are to analyse the paradoxes of the relationship between racist discourse or ideology and nationalist discourse or ideology.[4] Most of the time, racism is not at all functional from the point of view of nationalism; on the contrary, it sets up divisions within it that are at once superfluous and cumbersome. And yet there is virtually no historical example of nationalism *without* a racist supplement. I think that racism is an elaboration and forward rush of the contradictions of nationalism, driven both by its historical necessity and by its

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[4] I have tried to show elsewhere that this relationship functions according to a logic of 'supplement' or 'excess'. See the chapter 'Racism and Nationalism' in I. Wallerstein and E. Balibar, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, forthcoming London 1991.

practical impossibility. (I say impossibility because no nationalism can achieve in the real world its ideal of a purified, totally hegemonic community.) But this forward rush would not be possible if it were not at the same time a *rush backwards*—that is to say, if racist schemas of thought were not deposited in the past of nationalism. Ideological efficacy is the efficacy of the past: indeed, we might even say that ideology as such is nothing but this efficacy.

And yet it is quite evident that no explanation in terms of the past can supply the reasons why racist perceptual schemas of national, ethnic and social 'difference' are reactivated and combined in a new way. It is therefore necessary *at the same time* to track down the structural foundations of present-day racism.

The structure that has so far received the most analytic attention—particularly in countries like France where a Marxist tradition of interpreting social contradictions is combined with the massive and long-standing presence of immigrant workers who have come in successive waves from all parts of the world—is the socioeconomic foundation. Or, to be more precise, it is the existence of institutional discrimination based on employment structures and, more fundamentally, on the systematic use by capitalism of a mechanism for differential reproduction of the labour force. At least at a general level, there is a match between (a) skill grading; (b) proportion of foreign workers; (c) the various modes of work-force reproduction which allow capital to reduce training and upkeep costs on unskilled workers by bringing them from dominated ('peripheral') regions of the world economy, where non-commodity modes of production partly prevail and which lack those 'social rights' that the labour movement of the 'advanced' countries has been able to impose for more than a century.

It is precisely this mode of differential reproduction which the European Community officially ratifies and will probably seek to protect —the only qualification being that it *also* introduces mechanisms for the incorporation of ex-colonial populations in the European space, which would appear to be counter-productive in terms of capitalist profitability. To use Wallerstein's terminology, this situation structurally underpins a process of *ethnicization* of grading systems and inequalities within the general workforce, whose 'subjective' counterpart is that institutionalization of racial-cultural prejudices among dominators and dominated, and above all among the dominated themselves, on which ruling-class policy can play at its own risk. Wallerstein adds that technological changes, and above all the new configurations of the world market, force a continual shift in the demarcations that are 'functional' to the system. Thus, in France before the war, the demarcation lines passed mainly between the French and the Italians, Poles and Spaniards; today they tend to run between 'Europeans' and people from 'the South' (Asians excepted). We can therefore expect that ethnic imagery crystallized in ideological stereotypes will continually lag behind the real relations, which are actually 'ethnicized' class relations.

This analysis seems to me unassailable at its own level. But I would just like to add a couple of supplementary points. First, it is true that differential reproduction of the labour force, which plays on the opposition between centre and periphery, is a constant feature of the history of capitalism. But its social and political effects are today being modified by revolutionary changes in the organization and functioning of communications. The capitalist world is no longer just a 'world economy': it is also a space of unified and monopolized world communications in which, potentially, all populations are somehow immediately 'visible' to, and in contact with, one another.[5] Such a world has never before existed in history. Thus, the *two humanities* which have been culturally and socially separated by capitalist development—opposites figuring in racist ideology as 'sub-men' and 'super-men', 'underdeveloped' and 'overdeveloped'—do not remain external to each other, kept apart by long distances and related only 'at the margins'. On the contrary, they interpenetrate more and more within the same space of communications, representations and life. Exclusion takes the form of *internal exclusion at world level*: precisely the configuration which, since the beginnings of the modern era, has fuelled not only xenophobia or fear of foreigners, but also racism as fear and hatred of *neighbours* who are near and different at the same time.

Now, the development of class racism, even in countries where the labour movement has had an internationalist tradition, corresponds to the passage from a phase of 'extensive' accumulation—in which immigrant workers were recruited *en masse* but confined to special jobs—to a phase of crisis and unemployment, followed by new, 'intensive' accumulation which cuts unskilled labour to a minimum in the industries and services of the 'centre'. This sequence has coincided with the relative stabilization in the EC area of populations such as the Turks in Germany or the North Africans in France who were originally imported from abroad in the fifties and sixties. This relative stabilization has meant 'family regroupment' and the emergence of a 'second' or even 'third' generation which cannot be discriminated against in the same way as the first.

The result of all this is that, although the cleft within the labour force is still a class relation, the dominant aspect no longer tends to be super-exploitation. Rather it is competition on the labour market in a context of change, *common* pauperization of masses of 'national' and foreign workers, and the formation of ghettoes housing an industrial reserve army or, to use William Julius Wilson's expression, a multiracial and multicultural underclass. Here we come to the structural phenomenon which characterizes the current phase and constantly fuels tensions between the exploited themselves: *ethnic 'difference' is globally maximized (at the level of the world) but locally minimized (at the level of the town).*

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[5] To gain a sense of the novelty, and the paradox, involved in this situation, the reader may like to refer back to Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (London 1983). The community is 'imagined' or 'imaginary', in Anderson's analysis, because the individuals who compose it do not, for the most part, ever meet or 'see' one another. But in the world today, 'nationals' who still do not see one another as such are continually meeting 'non-nationals' in the street or seeing them on television, and vice versa.

Unless this paradox is analysed in detail, it is impossible to understand the formation of 'neo-racism' and, in particular, the tendency for 'biological' stereotypes forged in the epoch of slavery and colonization to pass into 'cultural' stereotypes corresponding to the search for 'little differences' between equally impoverished proletarians.

The Role of the State

These further analytical points cannot suffice, however, for they remain caught within the area of economy; or, to be more precise, they cling to an immediate correspondence between economic structures and ideological formations. They abstract from the essential mediation through which economic tendencies are articulated to collective representations in modern societies. I am referring to the role played by the state right down to the organization of everyday relations between individuals, and so to the effects that the crisis of state institutions has upon 'mass thinking'.

This dimension seems to me absolutely determinant, and it takes us back to our earlier question regarding the articulation between racism and nationalism, and the form this takes in the present conjuncture. I would like to propose the following thesis. In essence, modern racism is never simply a '*relationship to the Other*' based upon a perversion of cultural or sociological difference; it is a relationship to the Other *mediated by the intervention of the state*. Better still—and it is here that a fundamentally unconscious dimension needs to be conceptualized—it is *a conflictual relationship to the state which is 'lived' distortedly and 'projected' as a relationship to the Other*.

This would explain why 'national preference', as the French Far Right has called it, is of such formidable importance in the present-day racist complex. This national preference is both an objective institution and a phantasm through which all national individuals tend to perceive the special character of their own relationship of dependence and demand vis-à-vis the state. It is in the power of none of us to escape this entirely: for that would require being able to free oneself from dependence on the state. And we are all the less able to do so if we are *less privileged* in actual life, if we ourselves suffer manifold discrimination, are treated as 'subjects' rather than 'citizens', by the functioning of the state administration, the educational system, the political machine, and so on.

In fact it is the state qua nation-state which actually produces national or pseudo-national 'minorities' (ethnic, cultural, occupational). Were it not for its juridical and political intervention, these would remain merely potential. Minorities only exist in actuality from the moment when they are codified and controlled. Similarly it is the state which, for more than a century, has established the strictest possible correlation—which can never be total, however—between citizenship or nationality rights and individual or collective social rights, thereby becoming itself a '*national-social state*'. All the 'advanced' states, especially European states whether capitalist or socialist, are national-social states. The state's family policy is at the heart of this apparatus

—which helps to make it a highly sensitive aspect of racial and xeno-phobic imagery. Lastly, it is the state which develops in a contradict-ory manner what might be called *a security apparatus resting on insecur-ity*: that is, an administrative, police and judicial apparatus designed to protect one part of the population while increasing the risks for another part, without it ever being possible to draw clearly, at the neces-sary place, the demarcation line between the two 'groups' or 'popula-tions'.[6] The modern state, for instance, opens the door to 'clandestine' circulation of the foreign labour force, and at the same time represses it. It is thus the source of an image of itself as an over-powerful and powerless machine—a profoundly traumatic image for individuals.

In these conditions, the question which seems to me ultimately decis-ive for the developmental tendencies of racism in Europe, and to which I think we should continue to give thought, is the following: *What is the state today in Europe?* I would stress the importance of the way in which the question is formulated. It does not ask what the 'European state' is today, for such a question probably does not have a univocal meaning. The point is rather to take a very long-term per-spective for analysing the evolution of the historical *forms* of the state institution, and to ask within that perspective what the state is tend-ing to become, how it is behaving, and what functions it is fulfilling in the *European space* whose complexity we have just seen—a space which, in particular, cannot simply be reduced to the figure of a 'territory'.

No doubt such a question cannot be posed in simple terms, involving as it does more than one dimension. For example, one of the great enigmas, to which there is still no clear answer, concerns the state forms that will eventually succeed the old 'socialist' states, and the impact they will have on the status of politics in Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, we cannot evade the question of 'what the state is today in Europe'. I, at least, am convinced that it is the key to our project of analysing racism and foreseeing its lines of development.

Ambiguities of the State in Europe

Here too, it is a negative characteristic which first imposes itself. The state today in Europe is *neither national nor supranational*, and this ambiguity does not slacken but only grows deeper over time. In prac-tice this has the following significance in the economic-financial and social or juridical domains. In the distribution of powers between the level of 'national states' and the level of 'Community institutions', a continual redundancy, a competition between institutions, is becom-ing apparent. But what actually shapes reality is more a process tend-ing towards decomposition or deficiency of the state—a deficiency in power, in responsibility and in public qualities. The 'state' in Europe is tending to disappear as a power-centralizing institution, one to

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[6] The phantasm of the racist state, as instituted by Hitler, was precisely that individ-uals of the superior race should permanently feel in total security, and individuals of the inferior race in permanent insecurity. But the mechanism has a tendency to func-tion upside down: those who, because of the state itself, are in a situation of insecurity perceive themselves and are perceived as belonging to 'another race'.

which responsibility for policy can be ascribed and which exercises 'public' mediation (in both senses of the term) between social interests and forces. We might also express this by saying that we have entered a phase of new-style 'privatization' of the state, but in the guise of a multiplication and superimposition of public institutions.

This is probably due to the fact that there is no prior model, no historical precedent, for a state of this type, which stems from heterogeneous causes but is fundamentally conceived as *the state institution of a market*, a kind of 'liberal' utopia in practice. This utopia has had and will continue to have real effects, just as the opposing communist utopia had real effects. But it is attempting to pass over into reality during a historical epoch when the absolutely 'free' market can no longer exist. Any market today is inescapably a relationship of forces between public and private corporations of transnational scale, and any market is at once a *social* and an economic organization. However, what immediately strikes one about European construction is that, except for a few cover speeches, it *does not have a genuinely social dimension*. Neither market forces nor governments wanted a European state as a social state (we are tempted to say: social supranational state). And for a number of basic historical reasons, such a state could not be imposed, or even truly contemplated, by the labour movement at the time when it was in a position to influence the course of events. But precisely because it is today impossible to trace the frontier between social right and public right—or, if one prefers, 'social citizenship' and 'political citizenship'—the final conclusion is that *there is no 'European' law-governed state*. Plagiarizing Hegel's famous remark, I will therefore risk saying: *Es gibt keinen (Rechts)staat in Europa*.[7]

The upshot that we see all around us, including in the question that concerns us at this congress, is what might be called the reign of statism without a true state. If we understand by statism a combination of administrative/repressive practices and contingent arbitration of particular interests, including those of each nation or the dominant classes of each nation, then that is what is taking the place of the state, while giving the impression of a proliferation of the state. The invasion of power is the power of a vacuum. In many respects, this is like the situation we have grown used to seeing in the Third World, and which we take to be bound up with economic and cultural 'underdevelopment'. All the conditions are therefore present for a collective sense of *identity panic* to be produced and maintained. For individuals fear the state—particularly the most deprived and the most remote from power—but they fear still more its disappearance and decomposition. The anarchist and Marxist tradition never understood this, and has paid a very heavy price.

No doubt I will be asked what conclusions I draw here for the analysis of racism, and what practical attitude we might develop towards it. The following propositions lay no claim to originality. They seek only to lay the basis for a resolutely political approach to the question: that is,

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[7] See Hegel, *Die Verfassung Deutschlands*, a manuscript from 1799/1800: 'Deutschland ist kein Staat mehr.'

to identify the goals and means of anti-racist action, not only on the indispensable ground of ethics, ideology and welfare policies but above all on the ground of politics. I also do this in the idea that we are dealing not with a vicious circle but with a reciprocal relationship. Today the development of anti-racism as a transnational movement within, but necessarily going beyond, the European space undoubtedly contains one part of the perspectives for a renewal of democratic politics.

For the moment it is only in France that a unified racist political movement, or neo-fascism, has acquired significance, and we can see why it would be difficult for such a movement to develop and, above all, to unite in Europe: it would have to solve at one stroke the contradictions between nationalisms, secondarily between religious fundamentalisms, and so on. Nevertheless, *racist politics* exists as a tendency in Europe today. But is there an *anti-racist* politics? The answer is that there are only attempts. And this time I am tempted to say that anti-racist movements of opinion will become genuinely political only when they organize or coordinate their efforts at a European level. One of the conditions for this, particularly difficult to achieve, is that 'minorities' subject to discrimination should also, *first of all*, themselves succeed in finding a common language and common objectives, and in coordinating their own activities.

I recalled above the point already made by others that it is today impossible to trace a clear demarcation line in Europe between 'indigenous' and 'exogenous' populations, either in their living conditions or their culture, or even in terms of rights. (Most national law, and even Community law itself, have had to concede that foreign workers and their families have the same 'fundamental social rights' that 'Community' workers possess.) In making this point, I evidently suggested that this was one of the focuses for popular or class racism, especially within the working class. And this really is the danger, both for minorities and for democracy in general. But it is also—let's be cautious—what makes thinkable a reconstitution of political class movements. The classical labour movement was centred on production, and it had internationalism as a historical condition and a less and less effective horizon. A future anti-capitalist popular movement will probably have as its basis the inequalities that are suffered in common in a large number of social practices other than just production—for instance, education and living conditions. It certainly presupposes an effective anti-racism in tomorrow's Europe, something much more than internationalism.

Citizenship and Popular Sovereignty

But anti-racism in turn will not be able to resonate unless the question of *citizenship in Europe*—which is quite simply the other side of the problem of the state in Europe—is posed in all its dimensions. Again I say citizenship *in Europe* to avoid the ambiguities in the idea of 'European citizenship' or a fortiori 'the citizenship of Europeans', which is what would result if citizenship in Europe were defined only as the 'sum' of national citizenships; but that is anyway impossible.

The political aspect of the discriminatory structure within the

European space, or of the ethnic-social complex I discussed at the beginning, is that independently of official frontiers some individuals are de facto citizens and others are subjects within the European space. But whereas the former are citizens of a non-existent state, the latter cannot in practice be kept in an absolutely rightless position, unless it comes to forms of organized violence. This untenable situation will last as long as a compulsion is not felt to know *what the people is* in Europe: that is, to know how popular sovereignty is conceived and organized there, given that Europe wishes to be the space and example of a 'democratic' politics. It is necessary to turn away from the formula 'We are a people' (*Wir sind ein Volk*) or 'We are peoples', and to revert to '*Wir sind das Volk*' (We are *the* People), or rather to the question: '*Was ist das, "das Volk", in Europa?*'

This question, however, concretely entails many others that are its own components: the question of a universal right to vote, not just for its own sake but as a symbol of everyone's right to politics and hence to democratic control of state organizations and economic policies; the question of cultural equality between different historical populations who, in reality, contribute to the formation of European public opinion; the question of equal social and civil rights to which I have already alluded. And finally there is the question of the articulation between local (essentially urban) citizenship and international or transnational citizenship. Since it is impossible to extend the model of national citizenship, or of the national-social state, to a European level, other political roads and other legal formulas must be found to enhance civil relationships on both this side and the other side of the nation. In making this long detour through questions of theory and contemporary life, my only aim has been to reaffirm the indissociability of these different exigencies. Every state is not necessarily democratic, but a non-state by definition cannot be democratized.

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